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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 19-1554 
________________ 
 
ROBERT HOLLY, 
                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STRYKER CORPORATION; STRYKER SALES CORPORATION 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2:18-cv-00702) 
Honorable Berle M. Schiller, U.S. District Judge 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 27, 2019) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Robert Holly appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
his former employer, Stryker, on his Age Discrimination in Employment Act and 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act claims.1  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
I. Discussion2 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm if “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact” and if, viewing the facts “in the light most 
favorable to” Holly, Stryker is nonetheless “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citation omitted).  
Stryker asserts that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons3 for terminating 
Holly’s employment as a surgical-tools sales representative:  Holly received a customer 
complaint in violation of two performance and behavior plans (PBPs) and had a history 
of customer complaints.  See Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 
638, 646 (3d Cir. 2015); Smith, 589 F.3d at 691–92.  To defeat summary judgment, Holly 
                                                 
1 We have “determined that the interpretation of the PHRA is [generally] identical 
to that of federal anti-discrimination laws, including the ADEA,” so we analyze both 
claims together.  Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over Holly’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1367(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
3 Holly does not dispute that Stryker has articulated these legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons, and Stryker assumes arguendo that Holly met his burden of 
establishing a prima facie case, so we focus on the pretext prong of the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 804 (1973). 
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must show that these reasons are pretextual by “point[ing] to evidence that would allow a 
factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s reason[s].”4  Willis, 808 F.3d at 644 (citing 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)).  On appeal, Holly advances three 
arguments.   
 First, he maintains it was “too weak and implausible,” Appellant’s Br. 47, for a 
customer complaint that he sold a product that was soon to be superseded by a new 
version to trigger the second PBP’s warning that any “further complaints . . . will result in 
immediate termination, at any time,” A489, and that Stryker’s actual motive for firing 
him must therefore have been age discrimination.  But whether we think the complaint 
was valid is immaterial, for the question before us “is not whether the employer made the 
best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].”  
Willis, 808 F.3d at 647 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  The facts that sales 
representatives were given discretion when to notify customers of the product launch and 
that Stryker characterized the customer as feeling “duped” when she did not specifically 
use the word “duped,” Appellant’s Br. 51, may go to the soundness of Stryker’s decision, 
but they do not sway our conclusion that Stryker relied on this complaint in firing Holly 
and did not use it as a mere pretext.   
Next, Holly frontally attacks the second PBP, arguing that Stryker exaggerated the 
complaint that prompted the PBP and, thus, that both the PBP and Stryker’s reliance on it 
                                                 
4 Holly does not point to evidence that “an invidious discriminatory reason was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause,” as an alternative way to show 
pretext.  Willis, 808 F.3d at 645 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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reveal pretext.  While the PBP described the complaint as “many clinicians” being 
“frustrated” with Holly’s behavior “in the Operating Room” and his “very aggressive . . . 
approach,” A489, Holly claims that only two non-clinicians complained, but not about 
his behavior in the operating room, and that they did not say in depositions that he was 
aggressive.  Even crediting Holly’s version of the complaint, he does not draw out “such 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions,” Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 765, that would lead a reasonable juror to believe that Stryker inflated the 
severity of the complaint, much less that it fabricated this PBP to ultimately fire Holly for 
discriminatory reasons.   
Lastly, based on an implausible reading of the “Corrective Action” section of 
Stryker’s Employee Handbook, A636, Holly contends that his first PBP had become 
inactive and that Stryker’s reliance on it, including the complaints documented, was 
pretextual.  We agree with the District Court that Holly’s interpretation is belied by the 
Handbook’s plain text and by the uncontradicted testimony of Stryker’s Director of 
Human Resources.  See A750–57; Holly v. Stryker Corp., No. 18-702, 2019 WL 952233, 
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2019); see also Smith, 589 F.3d at 692 (finding no pretext where 
the plaintiff did not establish that the employer had a certain disciplinary policy or 
deviated from it).  A mere allegation such as this cannot defeat summary judgment.  In re 
IKON Office Sols., Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 
 Because Holly has failed to produce any evidence that would allow a factfinder to 
disbelieve that Stryker fired him for receiving numerous customer complaints and for 
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failing to correct this performance issue after two notices, we conclude that pretext is not 
a triable issue and that Stryker is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   
II. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Stryker.   
